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Introduction
Research on the so-called Democratic Peace
has, by and large, focused on the proposition
that democracies do not wage war against
each other. In concentrating on this
undoubtedly important aspect of state
behavior, democratic peace research has lost
sight of the larger picture of the complex
relationship between democracy (or regime
type more broadly) and security policy.1 This
© 2003 Journal of Peace Research,
vol. 40, no. 6, 2003, pp. 695–712
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA 
and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com
[0022-3433(200311)40:6; 695–712; 038288]
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This article extends democratic peace research, which has predominantly focused on the absence of war,
to the field of internal security cooperation. It argues that the mechanisms suggested by democratic
peace research (responsiveness of democratic leaders to public demands, democratic norms and culture,
and institutional constraints) can also be applied to the field of internal security cooperation: demo-
cratic leaders can be expected to respond to citizens’ demands for enhanced internal security and to
strive towards international cooperation in internal security. Moreover, democracies tend to form
security communities and to define their security in common terms, which also encourages mutual
assistance on issues of internal security. At the same time, however, democratic leaders’ ability to engage
in international cooperation is circumscribed by domestic institutions that safeguard individual rights.
In sum, the mechanisms suggested by democratic peace research can capture both the incentives and
difficulties of international cooperation on internal security among democratic states. The case of extra-
dition politics, which impacts both on the internal security of states and on standards of individual
rights (such as fair trial), serves to illustrate this point: since there is no general obligation for states to
extradite fugitives, extradition has traditionally been based on a series of bilateral treaties. Starting in
the 1950s, the members of the Council of Europe, all of which are liberal democracies, have negoti-
ated multilateral conventions designed to facilitate extradition among them. The high level of inter-
dependence and trust among the members of the European Union has led to more far-reaching
agreements, culminating in a European arrest warrant, which effectively overcomes remaining barriers
to extradition. In congruence to the democratic peace perspective, requests from non-democratic states
to become part of that regime have been turned down.
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helpful comments on previous drafts of this article. He is
also indebted to Frank Gadinger and Tobias Semmet for
valuable assistance in assembling the material for this study.
The author can be reached at wwagner@hsfk.de.
1 ‘Security’ has been one of the most contested concepts in
international relations (for a good overview, see Buzan,
Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 1–8; Müller, 2002b: 369).
Though scholars concur that the concept of security refers
to the absence of existential threats, they disagree on two
issues. First, the state has been challenged as the sole subject
of security. Instead, individuals, social groups, and
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is unfortunate for two reasons: first, the
study of further aspects of the relationship
between democracy and security policy
yields additional data that may help to
specify the mechanisms at work when demo-
cratic states cooperate on security issues.
Second, the analysis of further aspects of
democracies’ security policies may benefit
from being incorporated into the larger
research program on the democratic peace
because an established and well-specified set
of hypotheses linking regime type and state
action is already available.
This article aims to analyze cooperation
among Western European liberal democra-
cies on issues of internal security2 from the
perspective of the democratic peace. It
outlines how democracy and peace have been
connected in democratic peace research, and
argues that these mechanisms also apply to
other instances of state behavior. Then, it
further specifies a democratic peace perspec-
tive on issues of internal security cooper-
ation, in particular. The politics of
extradition among Western European liberal
democracies serves as an illustration. Finally,
the benefits of bringing together democratic
peace research and the analysis of internal
security cooperation are summed up.
Mechanisms of the Democratic
Peace
In developing an explanation for the absence
of war among democracies, democratic peace
research has suggested a set of interconnected
mechanisms3 that can be expected to apply
to democratic states’ security policies more
broadly.
Most prominent is the mechanism,
already suggested by Immanuel Kant, that a
democratic system of rule makes leaders
especially responsive to the preferences of the
people. Because citizens are assumed to prefer
not to risk their lives in battlefield, leaders of
democratic states ‘typically experience high
political costs from fighting wars – always
from losing them, and often despite winning
them’ (Russett & Oneal, 2001: 54). Critics
have objected that leaders may shift the costs
of war to a minority in society and thus 
circumvent the pacifist preferences of the
public. A democracy, however, ensures a high
degree of responsiveness even if leaders are
assumed to be only interested in meeting the
minimum requirement for staying in office,
that is, the support of the winning coalition:
in autocracies, winning coalitions may be
small. As a result, it may be possible for
leaders to ensure their support by distribut-
ing private benefits instead of public goods.
However, as a winning coalition increases,
‘each member’s share of private goods
decreases. This makes public policy benefits
loom larger in the overall utility assessment of
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mankind have been suggested as equally appropriate
subjects. Second, there has been disagreement on what
constitutes an ‘existential’ threat, particularly whether it is
sufficient to focus on physical security or whether
economic, environmental, or social security must be taken
into account as well. For the purpose of an extension of
democratic peace research to internal security, as proposed
here, no extension to the economic, environmental, or
societal dimensions of security is required. It will be neces-
sary, however, to include individuals as subjects of security.
2 Whereas ‘external security’ refers to threats originating
from outside a state’s territory, usually from another state
or alliance of states, ‘internal security’ refers to threats orig-
inating from within a state or society, for example from ter-
rorist or criminal organizations (Lutz, 1998: 670). Because
a threat to internal security originates in the very society
that is to be protected, the strategies for the maintenance
of internal security differ from those deemed necessary for
external security. As a consequence, almost all states have
charged separate institutions with the provision of external
and internal security respectively. Whereas the military is
held responsible for defending a state’s territory against an
outside attack, the police and law enforcement agencies are
in charge of preventing the emergence of threats from
within a state. However, as borders have become increas-
ingly open, the distinction between external and internal
security has been increasingly blurred.
3 Among democratic peace researchers, the respective
validity of different mechanisms has been the subject of
considerable dispute. This debate has focused on the
respective merits of ‘institutional constraints’ and ‘demo-
cratic norms’. However, though these mechanisms are
distinct, they need not be treated as mutually exclusive. In
contrast, both mechanisms are ‘really complementary:
culture influences the creation and evolution of political
institutions, and institutions shape culture’ (Russett &
Oneal, 2001: 53).
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members of the winning coalition’ (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 1999: 794). Because winning
coalitions in modern democracies with uni-
versal suffrage comprise at least a majority of
the citizens, leaders in democracies have to
invest in the provision of public goods in
order to become re-elected. Such public
goods include foreign policies that result in
the promotion of a state’s religious or cultural
beliefs, or the enhancement of national
security (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
Another mechanism emphasizes the
importance of democratic norms and culture
(Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1993: 35ff.). Accord-
ing to the ‘democratic norms’ argument,
respect for individual freedom, self-determi-
nation, and human rights, as well as norms of
peaceful conflict regulation, have been
embedded in a democracy’s political culture
and institutionalized in its political system.
Because these norms have become part of
their identity, democracies can be expected ‘to
externalize their internal decisionmaking
norms and rules in their foreign policy
behavior’ (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 500).
However, such pacifist intentions are by
themselves not sufficient to overcome the
security dilemma that results from mutual
distrust rather than from aggressive inten-
tions. Moreover, pacifist intentions cannot
explain the large number of wars that democ-
racies have waged against non-democracies,
including weaker ones that had not attacked
them. In order to account for the democratic
peace, proponents of the ‘democratic norms’
argument have therefore turned to the
particular collective identity that emerges
among states with democratic norms and
culture. Democratic peace research has built
on the notion that states with similar norms
and cultures (be those democratic, socialist,
or ‘Asian’) may build collective identities that
help to mitigate distributional conflicts and
to overcome mistrust (Wendt, 1999: 353ff.).
However, democratic peace research has
emphasized that democratic states, in
particular, form collective identities that
effectively eliminate war between them. First
of all, the respect for individual freedom and
self-determination that is part of a democ-
racy’s identity leads to respect for ‘the rights
of others to self-determination if those others
are also perceived as self-governing’, that is,
fellow democracies (Russett, 1993: 31; see
also Owen, 1994). Moreover, ‘free speech and
the effective communication of accurate con-
ceptions of the political life of foreign peoples
is essential to establish and preserve the
understanding on which the guarantee of
respect depends’ (Doyle, 1983: 230). Finally,
democratic leaders can validate their peaceful
intentions ‘by pointing to the peaceful reso-
lution of conflicts inherent in their domestic
structures’ (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 503). Taken
together, states with democratic norms and
culture may form a collective identity that
prevents the violent escalation of disputes
between them. What is more, the ‘presump-
tion of amity’ from which fellow democracies
benefit (Doyle, 1986: 1161) may even entail
‘a concern for the welfare of others who fall
within the community’ and a definition of
‘national security interests in compatible
and/or collective ways’ (Kahl, 1999: 125f.).
Finally, the so-called ‘institutional con-
straints’ argument picks up the notion
already voiced by Machiavelli and Toc-
queville, that a democratic government’s
foreign policy will be severely circumscribed
by a system of checks and balances (Gaubatz,
1996: 113ff.). Democratic peace research has
emphasized that this ‘division of power . . .
will slow down decisions to use large-scale
violence and reduce the likelihood that such
decisions will be made’ (Russett, 1993: 40).4
At the same time, however, the large number
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4 To be sure, democratic states differ in the extent to which
they constrain the executive. In majoritarian democracies,
such as Westminster parliamentary and semi-presidential
systems, the executive sets policy and the legislative usually
does not block executive decisions. By contrast, in presi-
dential systems like the USA, the executive is heavily con-
strained by a powerful legislative (Elman, 2000: 93; see also
Auerswald, 1999). These differences among democracies
might blur the line between democratic and non-demo-
cratic systems of rule.
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of veto players in democratic systems such as
parliaments and courts does not seem to con-
strain governments from making inter-
national commitments in general. Empirical
studies found that, on the contrary, democ-
racies are more likely than others to join
international organizations in the first place
(Russett, Oneal & Davis, 1998: 462). From
an institutionalist point of view, the prone-
ness of democracies to cooperate is explained
by their particular capability to make credible
commitments. According to Gaubatz, ‘the
same actors that make it difficult for demo-
cratic states to enter into commitments also
make it harder to get out of them’ (Gaubatz,
1996: 121; see also Martin, 2000). Thus, the
‘institutional constraints’ argument does not
necessarily apply to making international
commitments in general. Though the con-
ditions under which government policy will
be constrained most effectively have yet to be
examined more thoroughly, it seems clear
that, in democracies, checks and balances are
especially effective whenever government
policy is seen to undermine the democratic
system of rule itself or to endanger existing
standards of individual rights.
These mechanisms, identified by demo-
cratic peace research, have not only been
studied with regard to the democratic peace
proper but have been analyzed with regard to
an increasingly broad range of security
policies. By treating the absence of war
among democracies as only one effect of
these mechanisms that characterize the
behavior of democracies, scholars have
broadened the research agenda of the demo-
cratic peace and have traced further aspects
of state behavior (and security policy in
particular) back to a state’s system of rule as
well.5 For example, studies found that so-
called Militarized Interstate Disputes
(MIDs)6 are significantly less likely to occur
in democratic dyads than in non-democratic
or mixed dyads (Maoz & Russett, 1993;
Bremer, 1993: 241). Insofar as MIDs do
occur, they are significantly more likely to be
resolved by compromise and third-party
mediation in democratic dyads than in other
dyads (Dixon, 1994; Mousseau, 1998:
226f.). Moreover, democracies experience
less domestic violence, including ‘democide’
and civil wars (Rummel, 1995).7 In addition,
the impact of regime type has been examined
even beyond the realm of security policy. For
example, research has been carried out on the
relationship between regime type and inter-
dependence. Though the evidence is not
entirely conclusive, a large number of studies
found that democracies trade more among
themselves than other pairs of states (Russett
& Oneal, 2001: 218ff.), thereby allowing for
a higher level of mutual dependence. There-
fore, democracies are especially likely to 
form a ‘security community’, characterized
by ‘dependable expectations of “peaceful
change” among its population’ (Deutsch et
al., 1957: 5; see also Adler & Barnett, 1998).
As the previous paragraphs have demon-
strated, research on the democratic peace is
by no means exhausted by studying the
absence of war among democracies. In
contrast, a broad range of policies has been
traced back to a state’s system of rule, with
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5 Such suggestions are often linked to a Lakatosian view of
science, according to which research programs (such as
‘neorealism’ or ‘liberalism’) should specify a set of core
assumptions and cover an extensive range of phenomena
by specifying auxiliary hypotheses (cf. Doyle, 1996: 365f.).
To the extent that non-security issues are incorporated into
the research program, one may regard the democratic peace
as a part of a (scientific) liberal research program (Moravc-
sik, 1997, 2003). Here, ‘liberalism’ refers to studies that
chose a ‘bottom-up’ approach to international politics
(Moravcsik, 1997), according to which a state’s institutions
and a society’s preferences have a more profound impact on
international politics than various states of the inter-
national system such as ‘anarchy’ or ‘bipolarity’.
6 MIDs are conflicts short of war, including the display and
threat of force (Gochman & Maoz, 1984).
7 Doyle (1996: 365f.) suggested adding ‘defense policies –
which way do the weapons point and why? Intelligence
cooperation – do liberals resist better the temptation to
engage in covert activity. . . . Foreign aid – is there a
“democratic difference” discriminating, other things equal,
in favor of democracies?’.
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the help of the same set of mechanisms.
Treating additional instances of state
behavior as further observable implications
has improved our understanding of the
mechanisms at work. For example, the fact
that MIDs do occur at all among democra-
cies has been considered to emphasize the
importance of structural as opposed to
normative constraints, because according to
democratic norms even the threat of force is
illegitimate, whereas the checks and balances
in democracies become the more constrain-
ing the more conflicts escalate (Russett,
1993: 90; Hellmann & Herborth, 2001: 7).
However, the analysis of a broad range of
state policies as effects of the same mechan-
isms does not necessarily lead to a virtuous
circle of mutually supportive peaceful
policies as pictured, for example, by Russett
& Oneal (2001). Instead, mechanisms may
interact in ways in which either one mechan-
ism counteracts the other or in which both
of them may produce results jointly that
none of them could have achieved alone
(Müller, 2002a: 56). For example, democra-
cies have a tendency to establish, with fellow
democracies, cooperative relations that may
include a transfer of decisionmaking compe-
tencies to international bodies. At the same
time, citizens in a democracy value their
political system and therefore may oppose
any further transfer of decisionmaking com-
petencies to international institutions
because it undermines the ability of the
public to participate in the decisionmaking
process in the first place (Dembinski &
Hasenclever, 2001). From a democratic
peace perspective, two mechanisms charac-
teristic of democracies conflict with each
other, and lead to what Müller (2002a) has
termed an ‘antinomy of the Democratic
Peace’.
Democratic Peace and the Politics of
Internal Security
Though the democratic peace has inspired
research on an ever broader range of issues,
cooperation on issues of internal security, by
contrast, has still received only little attention.
An obvious reason is that internal security has
traditionally not been an issue of international
politics. However, increasing interdependence
– which may be treated as an effect of democ-
racy in the first place (see above) – has put
issues of internal security on the agenda of
international politics, especially within the
European Union, where interdependence has
reached an unprecedented level. Based on the
mechanisms outlined above, I will now outline
a democratic peace perspective on internal
security cooperation among democracies.
According to the ‘responsiveness’
argument, democratic leaders are expected to
provide public goods, including national
security, in order to improve their chances of
staying in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2003). Especially in the post-Cold War era,
the improvement of internal security is likely
to play an increasingly important role in
democratic leaders’ efforts to ensure re-
election. Moreover, especially for leaders in
the highly interdependent Western European
democracies, international cooperation is
likely to become an increasingly important
means for doing so. Public opinion surveys
support the view that citizens in EU member-
states expect efficient international cooper-
ation on (internal) security. According to
surveys conducted by Eurobarometer,
citizens regard ‘fighting terrorism’ and
‘fighting organised crime and drug traffick-
ing’ as a priority for the European Union.8
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8 According to the five most recent issues of Eurobarome-
ter (which present field work from May 2001 to April
2003), ‘fighting terrorism’, ‘fighting organised crime’, and
‘maintaining peace and security in Europe’ have been
regarded as priorities of EU action (for detailed figures, see
the Eurobarometer homepage at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
public_opinion/).
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With regard to internal security in particular,
more than two-thirds of the EU population
favor EU-level decisionmaking in fighting
organized crime.9 At the same time, however,
a large majority favors keeping the compe-
tencies for police and justice at the national
level.10 Apparently, the public hesitates to
transfer competencies to authorize force and
to safeguard human and citizen rights to an
international level, while at the same time
endorsing efforts to enhance internal
security.11 Because democratic peace research
leads us to expect that democratic leaders
respond to public demand, we should expect
them to make efforts to combat international
crime, while keeping as many competences as
possible in the areas of police and justice at
the national level. Given that effective inter-
national cooperation requires some transfer
of decisionmaking competencies, it is diffi-
cult to meet public demands for internal
security.
This dilemma, resulting from contradic-
tory popular demands, is further exacerbated
if the other two mechanisms are taken into
account. On the one hand, the ‘political
culture’ argument underlines the capacity or
even expectation that democratic leaders
cooperate internationally on issues of internal
security. As outlined above, democratic peace
research expects security politics among
democracies to be characterized by 
compatible or collective definitions of
national security interests (Kahl, 1999: 95,
125). There is nothing in this proposition
that suggests an inherent limit to issues of
external security. Thus, a democratic peace
perspective leads us to expect that democra-
cies will incorporate their fellow democracies’
demand for internal security into their own
definition of (internal) security. Furthermore,
given that international institutions are an
important means to resolve conflict peace-
fully (Hasenclever, 2002) and that democra-
cies are particularly inclined to establish and
maintain international institutions, the
democratic peace perspective leads us to
expect that democracies will establish insti-
tutions designed to further the internal
security of their members. Moreover, as
Burley (1992: 1922) has pointed out, ‘liberal
states relate to other liberal states differently
than they do to nonliberal states in their legal
. . . relations’. Liberal states form a ‘zone of
law’ based on the principles of mutual respect
and mutual application of each other’s
domestic law (1992: 1910, 1923).
On the other hand, the ‘institutional
constraints’ argument underlines the diffi-
culties of democratic leaders in cooperating
effectively in internal security. As outlined
above, institutional constraints have been
regarded as limiting the capacity of bellicose
leaders to escalate international crises. With
regard to internal security, similar insti-
tutional constraints may limit a democratic
leader’s capacity to make international com-
mitments that endanger individual rights,
for example commitments to prosecute
people (nationals or foreigners) or to assist
other states in doing so by making available
personal data, for example as part of intelli-
gence cooperation, by letting foreign police
operate on one’s territory (e.g. in ‘hot
pursuit’), or by extraditing alleged criminals
(see below). Whenever standards of indi-
vidual rights are in danger of being lowered
or circumvented, courts and other
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9 The exact wording of the question is: ‘For each of the
following areas, do you think that decisions should be
made by the (Nationality) government, or made jointly
within the European Union? The fight against organised
crime’. In March/April 2003, 72% were in favor of EU
level decisionmaking (see http://europa.eu.int/comm/public
_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/EB59_Rapport_Final_FR.pdf,
p. 95).
10 In March/April 2003, only 30% (police) and 34%
(justice), respectively, favored EU level decisionmaking,
whereas 71% (police) and 66% (justice) favored decisions
made at the national level (see http://europa.eu.int/
comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59/EB59_Rapport_
Final_FR.pdf, p. 95).
11 See also Dalton & Eichenberg (1998: 259ff.), who argue
that ‘classic interdependence issues’ receive the highest
support rates, whereas policymaking on individual rights
receives the least support.
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institutions in charge of maintaining the
rule of law can be expected to intervene and
to prevent the respective commitments.
However, it is important to note that the
standards of individual rights vary among
democratic states. Consequently, democra-
cies may pursue different internal security
policies internationally. What is more, con-
flicts may even arise among democratic
states about appropriate standards of pro-
tection of individual rights. From a demo-
cratic peace perspective, these differences
among democracies may be seen as a recon-
ceptualization of the explanatory variable:
whereas parliamentary leverage over govern-
ment decisions has been regarded as the
most important institutional constraint in
democratic peace research proper, judicial
safeguarding of individual rights emerges as
the pivotal institutional constraint in the
realm of internal security cooperation.12
Taken together, the politics of internal
security cooperation among liberal democra-
cies is characterized by what Müller (2002a:
71) has called the ‘fear of Brussels’ antinomy.
On the one hand, democratic leaders are
inclined to define their security interests in
collective terms and to engage in mutually
beneficial international agreements enhanc-
ing internal security. Moreover, citizens
expect democratic governments to pursue
foreign policies designed to enhance internal
security. On the other hand, domestic insti-
tutions circumscribe democratic leaders’
ability to transfer decisionmaking competen-
cies to the international level. Moreover, the
public in democracies expects the govern-
ment to ‘protect’ participatory and judicial
standards against being undermined by
international institutions. As the example of
extradition politics will demonstrate, demo-
cratic leaders may decrease the tensions
inherent in internal security politics by also
transferring participatory and judicial stan-
dards to the international level.
Extradition Politics in Western
Europe
I will now illustrate the added value of ana-
lyzing internal security cooperation from a
democratic peace perspective by taking a
closer look at the politics of extradition
among Western Europe’s liberal democracies.
The case of extradition politics is well suited
for such a purpose because extradition
politics significantly impacts on both the
internal security of a state and on a central
feature of democratic states, namely, their
standard of protection of individual rights.
The extradition of criminals (including ter-
rorists) is an important contribution to the
internal security of the requesting state
because it prevents criminals from evading
legal prosecution. At the same time, extradi-
tion impacts on the requested person’s right
to a fair trial or, in case of political offences,
asylum.
Before this case study is presented,
however, two methodological notes of
caution seem appropriate.13 First, extradition
politics in Western Europe will not be
compared to extradition politics within other
groupings of states that can also be under-
stood as a community of shared values (be
that ‘socialist’ or ‘Islamist’). As a conse-
quence, the empirical material presented
here does not constitute a ‘crucial test’ of the
democratic peace proposition in the realm of
internal security. Whether other groups of
Wolfgang Wagner DE M O C R AT I C PE AC E A N D EX T R A D I T I O N 701
12 As a consequence of this reconceptualization, conflicts
between democracies with different standards of individual
rights become more visible. This is an innovative step in
democratic peace research, because the traditional focus on
the absence of war has downplayed security conflicts
among democracies. However, it should be noted that
these cleavages among democracies do not replace the more
important cleavage between democracies, on the one hand,
and non-democracies on the other hand. Otherwise, it
would be questionable whether the research presented here
still belongs to the democratic peace.
13 I am indebted to the anonymous reviewers and to Nils
Petter Gleditsch for pointing these issues out to me.
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‘like-minded states’ (e.g. ‘socialist’ or
‘Islamist’) may have equally effective extradi-
tion regimes is simply beyond the scope of
this article.14 Thus, the case study presented
here is best understood as an explorative
study that may demonstrate the usefulness of
bringing democratic peace research and the
analysis of internal security cooperation
together, and that may encourage further
(and preferably comparative) research on
that issue.
Second, and related to the first issue, it is
hardly possible to discriminate between the
impact of ‘democracy’ and that of other
factors such as ‘interdependence’ on extradi-
tion politics in Europe, because only a single
case has been examined. In order to buttress
the causal claims inherent in democratic
peace theory in the realm of internal security
politics, a comparative (or even large-n)
study that allows for the effective control of
potential further factors would be necessary.
Thus, the aim of this case study is limited to
demonstrating the plausibility that the
mechanisms suggested by democratic peace
research are at play in European extradition
politics and to encouraging further studies.
As the following paragraphs will outline
in more detail, extradition politics among
liberal democracies can be characterized by a
‘fear of Brussels’ antinomy: On the one hand,
effective extradition regimes among demo-
cratic states can be expected because of both
the ‘responsiveness’ and the ‘political culture’
argument: The responsiveness of democratic
governments leads to the expectation that
democratic states will make efforts to
enhance internal security by, among other
things, negotiating effective extradition
regimes. According to the ‘political culture’
argument, democracies will tend to define
their internal security in common terms.
This leads to the expectation that liberal
democracies will cooperate on internal
security with each other by granting extradi-
tion to other democracies. At the same time,
requests from non-democratic states, which
suffer from a ‘presumption of enmity’, will
not necessarily be granted. On the other
hand, democratic leaders can be expected to
face high domestic barriers against making
commitments on extradition. From a demo-
cratic peace perspective, democratic leaders
can be expected to take the public’s concerns
into account, including public skepticism
over lowering standards of individual rights.
Additional barriers result from the insti-
tutional constraints inherent in democratic
systems: parliaments and courts can be
expected to be reluctant to endorse any
government commitment on extradition if
domestic standards of individual rights are
endangered. Taken together, democratic
leaders are confronted with contradicting
expectations, typical of a ‘fear of Brussels’
antinomy. As will be outlined below,
however, the high level of mutual trust as
well as newly created safeguards for indi-
vidual rights in the European Union may
help to overcome the barriers against extra-
dition commitments and thus contribute to
the creation of an internal security com-
munity.
Baseline: Extradition as a Sovereign
Right
Extradition – a practice that can be traced
back to medieval and even ancient societies
(Haas, 2000: 59) – is considered to be the
most important means of international legal
assistance in criminal matters. Notwith-
standing this long tradition, however, the
principle of sovereignty has prevented the
emergence of an acknowledged norm of
international customary law, according to
which states would be required to extradite
criminals at the request of other states (Ipsen,
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states is known to have ever achieved a similarly effective
extradition regime. For a brief account of mutual assistance
in criminal matters among socialist countries, see Gardocki
(1986).
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1999: 707). By contrast, the principle of 
sovereignty has emphasized that states do not
share a common legal order, but that each of
them has a distinct legal order of its own,
which is not necessarily respected by other
states. Because another state’s legal order is
generally perceived as ‘alien’, there is no
reason why a state should contribute to its
effectiveness by extraditing persons who have
fled its jurisdiction. As a consequence, the
decision whether to grant extradition to
another state has traditionally been an
exclusive right of sovereign states. Even in
constitutional states in which governments
may not extradite a person if the presiding
court has denied its admissibility, govern-
ments remain free to refuse extradition where
it is admissible.15 Instead of extraditing,
states may grant asylum to the requested
person. In practice, however, states have
passed a large number of bilateral treaties
that are usually guided by the following prin-
ciples: first, extradition is only granted on the
condition that the requesting state will do
the same in comparable cases (principle of
reciprocity or do ut des). Second, a person is
extradited only if the offence under con-
sideration is punishable in both the request-
ing and the requested state (principle of
double or dual criminality). This principle
highlights the perceived ‘alienness’ of other
states’ legal orders, which necessitates a new
examination of whether the requested person
can be considered a fugitive from justice in
the first place.
Extradition Among Members of the
Council of Europe
For the Western European democracies, the
Council of Europe (CoE) was a natural
forum to negotiate effective extradition
regimes because a democratic system of rule
and the respect of individual rights have been
preconditions for membership.16 Thus, the
Council of Europe has provided an oppor-
tunity to enhance internal security among
states whose general relationship has been
characterized by an ‘assumption of amity’.
Indeed, the Council of Europe’s Com-
mittee on Crime Prevention quickly became
a major forum for elaborating a series of
multilateral conventions that aim to facilitate
extradition among its member-states. The
demand for a convention on extradition was
first expressed by the deputies of the CoE’s
Consultative Assembly in 1951. The
member-state governments responded to this
demand by negotiating the European Con-
vention on Extradition of 1957,17 which has
been the ‘mother convention’ for all further
developments. This convention has estab-
lished a general obligation for the member-
states to extradite ‘all persons against whom
the responsible authorities of the requesting
Party have issued warrants for an offense or
who are wanted . . . for the carrying out of a
sentence or detention order’ (art. 1). In
doing so, the convention marks a large step
forward towards an internal security com-
munity. However, though the general obli-
gation softens the principle of state
sovereignty, the principle of double crimi-
nality remains in place: Extradition is
granted only if the offence is punishable in
both the requesting and the requested state
by deprivation of liberty for a maximum
period of at least one year (art. 2). Moreover,
contracting parties retain the right to refuse
the extradition of their nationals (art. 6). The
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15 For the United Kingdom, see Stanbrook & Stanbrook
(2000: 160).
16 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Council of Europe
was probably the only natural forum for cooperation
among democracies. With regard to the European Com-
munity, a democratic system of rule was a de facto pre-
requisite of membership, too, but the focus of the EC’s
activities were on economic integration. Though NATO
has become a security community of democratic states
(Risse-Kappen, 1996), democracy was, during the first
decades of the alliance, no prerequisite for membership, as
the cases of Portugal, Greece, and Turkey illustrate.
17 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListe-
Traites.htm. The convention came into force in April 1960.
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member-state governments were also eager
to keep national safeguards against any
violation of individual rights in place. Extra-
dition is not granted if the offence is regarded
as a political offence or if the request appears
to aim at prosecution on account of race,
religion, nationality or political opinion (art.
3). Thus, the convention leaves a member-
state’s right (or duty) to grant asylum
untouched. Moreover, extradition may be
refused if the offence is punishable by death
(art. 11).
In addition to these qualifications in the
convention itself, any party to the conven-
tion can add reservations and declarations
further limiting the scope of the general obli-
gation to extradition.18 Thus, in sum, the
European Convention is best regarded as an
important basis for legal cooperation that
may be intensified by further treaties (bilat-
eral as well as multilateral) but that, by itself,
does not necessarily significantly change the
practice of extradition. Indeed, member-
states have still experienced difficulties in
having persons extradited by the requested
parties. For example, France refused to extra-
dite members of the Basque terrorist group
ETA to Spain and members of the ‘Red
Army Faction’ to Germany (Busch, 1995:
290).
As expected from a democratic peace
perspective, Western European democracies
considered these standards of the extradition
mother convention increasingly inappro-
priate. In particular, Western European
democracies considered the ‘political exemp-
tion clause’, according to which political
offences were exempted from the obligation
to extradite, inappropriate. Because the
Western European democracies have formed
a community of values, they also consider
each other sufficiently trustworthy to expect
no misuse of political extradition claims.
Thus, in 1975, an additional protocol was
signed which excluded war crimes and
crimes against humanity from the category
of non-extraditable political offenses. More
importantly, in 1977, the members of the
Council of Europe (CoE) signed the
European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, which is designed to facilitate the
extradition of persons who have committed
terrorist crimes. Since terrorism is inherently
difficult to define (and negotiations on a
definition were considered to be too time-
consuming), the member-states chose to list
a series of offences that shall be exempted
from the ‘political exemption clause’, includ-
ing the unlawful seizure of an aircraft,
offences involving an attack against the life
of internationally protected persons, and
offences involving the taking of hostages.
In congruence with a democratic peace
perspective, the facilitation of extradition
was accompanied by safeguards to ensure
that the provision of internal security would
not come about at the expense of human and
civil rights. Thus, art. 14 stipulates that the
terrorism convention can be denounced with
immediate effect, which is an unusual clause
in an international treaty. This provision is
designed to ensure that no obligation to
extradite arises if a CoE member can no
longer be considered democratic (as Greece
in 1967) but has not yet been excluded from
the CoE (Bartsch, 1977: 1987).
Enhanced Cooperation Within the
European Union: Towards a European
Arrest Warrant
Among the CoE states, the members of the
European Union have formed an inner
circle.19 By establishing a single market and
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Hungary, have declared that they retain the right to refuse
extradition for humanitarian reasons.
19 Immediately after World War II, Western European
democracies agreed on the desirability of integration but
disagreed on its institutional form. Whereas the United
Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries favored an inter-
governmental model, France, Germany, Italy, and the
Benelux countries aimed for a more ambitious, supra-
national institutional order. On the basis of the lowest
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a single currency, economic interdependence
among EU states has reached an exception-
ally high level. This high level of interdepen-
dence has brought about manifold incentives
for cooperation, in order to counter the
negative externalities of interdependence.
Indeed, interdependence has been accom-
panied by a range of common policies and
strong supranational institutions. What is
more, economic interdependence and
cooperation have ‘spilled over’ into related
issue-areas, including internal security. Here,
the high level of economic interdependence
has contributed to the reduction and even
abolition of border controls, which in turn
has created a ‘common criminal space’, that
is, an area in which the combat and prose-
cution of crime is increasingly difficult
without transborder cooperation in criminal
matters.
Thus, theories of interdependence, such
as regime theory (Hasenclever, Mayer & 
Rittberger, 1997) and neofunctionalist inte-
gration theory (cf. Haas, 1958), may lead us
to expect closer cooperation on criminal
matters among EU member-states. What the
democratic peace perspective adds to this
picture are the mechanisms that have charac-
terized the process of building an internal
security community.20
Though there had been some cooperation
on issues of internal security since the
1970s,21 it was only in the early 1990s that
the Maastricht Treaty introduced ‘Justice and
Home Affairs’ as a distinct ‘pillar’ of the
European Union.22 Within this framework,
the member-states negotiated a convention
relating to extradition between the member-
states of the EU that was signed in Septem-
ber 1996.23 In congruence with a democratic
peace perspective, the member-states
expressed ‘their confidence in the structure
and operation of their judicial systems and in
the ability of all Member States to ensure a
fair trial’ (preamble).24 On the basis of such
a high level of mutual trust, offenses may, in
principle, no longer be regarded as political
offenses (art. 5). Moreover, extradition obli-
gations generally also apply to nationals (art.
7).25 However, since the agreement was
negotiated in an intergovernmental frame-
work outside the European Community, the
convention had to be ratified by each
member-state. As expected from an ‘insti-
tutional constraints’ perspective, those
domestic institutions whose competencies
were to be diminished (e.g. the Conseil
d’État in France) opposed and delayed ratifi-
cation.26 As a consequence, democratic
leaders began looking for new ways to
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common denominator, the Council of Europe was estab-
lished along intergovernmental lines. Those aiming for a
more ambitious supranational integration founded the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and
the European Economic Community in 1958.
20 Moreover, adherents to a democratic peace perspective
may point out that democracies are particularly prone to
allowing for high levels of interdependence (Russett &
Oneal, 2001: 218ff.), which in turn contributes to mutual
trust.
21 Cooperation took place in the so-called TREVI group
(Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Inter-
national) that was part of European Political Cooperation.
However, since TREVI lacked any legal basis, no effective
policies could be agreed on.
22 Since 1985, the Schengen agreements had already
provided a framework in which an increasing number of
EU member-states cooperated in internal security politics.
However, the Schengen agreements have focused on police
cooperation and added little to the practice of extradition
in Western Europe.
23 ‘Convention Drawn up on the Basis of Article K.3 (now
Article 31) of the Treaty on European Union Relating to
Extradition between the Member States of the European
Union’ (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 11).
24 It is worth noting that the European Parliament’s report
on the matter states that ‘the system of extradition seems
to have less and less justification and raison d’être within a
Union of States governed by the rule of law and equally
respectful of human rights’. Moreover, the European Parlia-
ment expressed its disappointment that member-states
retain the possibility of entering reservations
(A4–0265/97).
25 Both provisions have had a limited effect, however,
because some member-states have made use of the possi-
bility to make a declaration that these provisions do not
apply to them.
26 At the end of 2001, Italy, Ireland, and France had still
not ratified the convention (see http://ue.eu.int/accords/
default.asp?lang = en).
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overcome the inefficiencies of the existing
extradition regime.
Spain, which has had a special interest in
having members of the terrorist group ETA
extradited to Spanish courts, took a leader-
ship role in establishing the mutual recog-
nition of court judgements as a new principle
in European extradition law.27 According to
that principle, states consider each other’s
legal and judicial systems trustworthy
enough to recognize any request for extradi-
tion without the many reservations that have
remained part of European extradition law.
The principle of mutual recognition implies
the abolition of the principle of double
criminality: a person must be extradited even
if the offense under consideration is not pun-
ishable in the requested state. Thus, the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition serves to enhance
security in areas that pose a particular
problem in some, though not all, member-
states, for example membership in terrorist
organizations for which some member-states
do not have respective legislation.28 Experts
have regarded the principle of mutual recog-
nition to be a ‘revolution in extradition law’
(Vogel, 2001: 937f.).
In the late 1990s, Spain had been engaged
in negotiating a series of bilateral treaties
with Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and
Belgium that were based on the principle of
mutual recognition. At the same time, the
Spanish government has successfully worked
on establishing this principle at the EU level:
at the special European Council in Tampere
(15–16 October 1999) that the Commission
and the Spanish government had suggested,
the member-states endorsed the principle of
mutual recognition as a basis for future
judicial cooperation.29 This new principle
was first applied to extradition.
The European Commission’s ‘proposal for
a European arrest warrant’30 that the
Tampere European Council had asked for
and that has been based on the principle of
mutual recognition was tabled in September
2001. Because of the terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington that coinciden-
tally occurred only days before the proposal
was made,31 the proposal received priority
treatment from politicians and much atten-
tion from the media and the public.32 Agree-
ment was reached within an extraordinarily
short period of merely three months. The
most important feature of the European
arrest warrant is that the requirement of dual
criminality, which had been the most
prominent impediment to extradition, is
replaced with the principle of mutual recog-
nition of court judgements among EU
member-states. This has become possible on
the basis of ‘a high level of confidence
between Member States’ to which the EU
states refer in the preamble.33 Moreover,
extradition is facilitated by abolishing the
political phase inherent in any extradition
procedure and by allowing for direct com-
munication between the issuing and the 
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27 This principle was already practised among the Nordic
countries – Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and
Iceland.
28 However, some member-states were eager to ensure that
no person would have to be extradited for an offense that
had deliberately been exempted from prosecution (e.g.
abortion).
29 Tampere European Council, 15–16 October 1999, 
Presidency Conclusions, especially No. 33 (Bulletin EU
10-1999).
30 European Commission, Proposal for a Council frame-
work decision on the European arrest warrant and the sur-
render procedures between the member-states. COM
(2001) 522 final/2, 25/9/2001 (OJ C 332 E, 27.11.2001,
305–319).
31 It is worth noting that the events of 11 September 2001
did not initiate the proposal: work on the proposal had
started in the summer of 2000.
32 The member-states, meeting at an extraordinary
European Council on 21 September, signify their ‘agree-
ment to the introduction of a European arrest warrant’
because ‘extradition procedures do not at present reflect the
level of integration and confidence between Member States
of the European Union’ (Conclusions and Plan of Action
of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21
September 2001).
33 OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, 1–20, here: p. 2.
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executing judicial authorities.34 This may be
considered a change from international to
transnational law that is also reflected in the
wording of the arrest warrant: the criminals
under consideration are no longer to be
‘extradited’ but to be ‘surrendered’.
In effect, the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 and the ensuing public demand
for enhanced internal security had created a
window of opportunity to overcome the
institutional constraints against far-reaching
extradition commitments that had been in
place in many EU member-states. Still, the
intensification of international cooperation
on criminal prosecution and the abolition of
principles designed for the protection of
nationals, etc. did not pass without concerns
being voiced about human and civil rights,
among others by nongovernmental organiz-
ations including ‘Justice’ and ‘Statewatch’.35
Several human and civil rights groups such
as Amnesty International had also been con-
sulted by the Commission before the
proposal was worded. During the decision-
making process at the EU level, the
European Parliament, which had no veto
power but had to be consulted, became the
voice of all those who had been concerned
about a lowering of human or civil rights
standards.36 The European Parliament failed
in inserting additional references to existing
human and civil rights obligations of the
member-states, particularly under the
‘European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’,
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and
the ‘1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees’. However, concerns about
human and civil rights have been met by the
Council. The final text states that implemen-
tation of the arrest warrant may be sus-
pended in the event of a severe breach of the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law by a member-state.
Moreover, the European Parliament suc-
ceeded in obtaining the assurance from the
Council that steps will be taken to improve
the standards of justice and the access to
justice in the member-states. The Com-
mission was charged with preparing a Green
Book on standards to be applied in criminal
proceedings, in order to properly protect
citizens throughout the European Union.
The democratic peace perspective is also
helpful in understanding the European
Union’s treatment of requests from non-
member-states to become a party to these
agreements. Such requests have been
received from a number of countries that
regard closer international cooperation in
criminal matters to be in their interest. As to
be expected from a democratic peace point
of view, such requests were denied in cases in
which the requesting states’ legal and judicial
systems are not considered sufficiently trust-
worthy. Thus, requests by Russia and Turkey
were denied by the European Union. In
contrast, negotiations on accession to the
European arrest warrant are to be under-
taken with Norway and Iceland, that is, two
states whose democratic character is beyond
doubt. This policy towards third states also
highlights that a high level of interdepen-
dence in criminal matters (as in EU–Russian
and EU–Turkish relations) is no sufficient
condition for more effective internal security
cooperation.
Finally, negotiations between the USA and
the EU member-states illustrate that internal
Wolfgang Wagner DE M O C R AT I C PE AC E A N D EX T R A D I T I O N 707
34 As regards government intervention, the European arrest
warrant basically formalizes a common practice because
government intervention had already become very unusual
among Western European democracies. Direct communi-
cation among competent authorities was already estab-
lished among the parties to the Schengen Agreement of
1990.
35 Concerns about the future of the rule of law have also
been voiced in national parliaments on the occasion of
ratification, for example in the Swedish Riksdagen, where
conservative and liberals joined the left and the greens in
opposing the proposal (Euobserver, 24 May 2002).
36 See the reports by Graham Watson, MEP on behalf of
the European Parliament (A5–0397/2001 of 14 November
2001 and A5–0003/2002 of 9 January 2002).
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security cooperation may also fail between
democratic states. Capital punishment and
the establishment of military courts after 11
September 2001 have been considered within
the EU to constitute insurmountable obsta-
cles to extradition. Though an extradition
agreement between the EU and the USA has
been signed in June 2003, the USA has not
been granted the same privileged status as EU
member-states. These tensions within the
transatlantic community highlight that the
standard of protection of individual rights
may become more influential in shaping
internal security cooperation than democratic
institutions proper.
The arrest warrant marks the climax of a
development characterized by a growing
willingness of Western European democra-
cies to improve their internal security by
extraditing (or surrendering) fugitives from
justice. At the beginning of this develop-
ment, extradition politics was imbued with
the principle of sovereignty and a concomi-
tant high level of skepticism towards any
other state’s legal order and judicial system.
Driven by their publics’ demand for
increased internal security and on the basis
of growing levels of mutual trust, Western
European democracies have, step by step,
acknowledged that their legal orders are
based on a common set of values that allows
for a facilitation of extradition. Most
importantly, the principle of double crimi-
nality, which used to reflect the skepticism
towards any other state’s legal order, has been
replaced by the principle of mutual recog-
nition, which emphasizes that there is a
common ‘zone of law’ even though differ-
ences in criminal justice remain. By the same
token, political offenses are no longer
exempted from extradition, because the
Western European democracies consider an
attack against the political order of any of
their members as an attack against their
common democratic values. Finally, political
actors who used to grant or refuse extradition
have been, by and large, replaced by judicial
actors who cooperate on a common basis of
supranational law. Common membership in
international institutions, particularly in the
Council of Europe and the European Union,
has contributed to this development in two
ways: first, cooperation in the European
Union has led to a high level of interdepen-
dence, which has in turn increased the
demand for a more effective extradition
regime. Second, both the Council of Europe
and the European Union have not only
expressed common values of democracy and
individual rights but have also effectively
linked membership to compliance with
them. The possibility to suspend the
membership of states because of their
violation of individual rights can be regarded
as a precondition for both the Council of
Europe’s convention on extradition and the
European Union’s arrest warrant.
Conclusion
This article has extended research on the
democratic peace to the analysis of internal
security cooperation in order to serve a
double purpose. First, the study of internal
security cooperation yields additional data
that may help to specify the mechanisms at
work when democratic states cooperate on
security issues. Second, the incorporation of
internal security into the larger research
program on the democratic peace helps to
highlight characteristic features of inter-
national cooperation on internal security. I
will conclude with examining each contri-
bution in turn.
As the development of extradition politics
among the Western European democracies
illustrates, liberal democracies not only
refrain from waging war against each other
but also pursue active policies to contribute
to each other’s security. This finding can be
added to a long list of further observable
implications of the original democratic peace
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thesis, affirming the importance of regime
type to state behavior and international
politics. At the same time, however, conflicts
between the USA and the EU have high-
lighted the importance of differences among
democracies. Though both are liberal
democracies that attribute great importance
to the protection of individual rights, the EU
member-states, on the one hand, and the
USA, on the other hand, subscribe to
different sets of individual rights (e.g. as
regards capital punishment), which severely
inhibits effective cooperation between them.
These differences have, of course, not been
reflected in most of the democratic peace
research that has focused on issues of external
security. The more the focus is shifted
towards issues of internal security (or the
more the line between internal and external
security is blurred), the more important
different sets of individual rights are likely to
become for the analysis of security politics –
the dispute over the establishment of the
International Criminal Court is just another
case in point. Though the difference between
democracies and non-democracies may still
carry the better part of the explanatory
burden in security politics, differences
between various types of democracies may
acquire more importance. In this regard,
research on internal security cooperation
may indicate a possible future development
of democratic peace research.
The analysis of extradition politics has con-
tributed to our understanding of the mechan-
isms linking regime type and security policy.
The high level of responsiveness of democratic
leaders to public demands has had ambivalent
effects on democracies’ extradition policies. As
survey data have illustrated, democratic
leaders are expected to enhance internal
security, if necessary by cooperating inter-
nationally, and at the same time to keep com-
petencies for justice at the national level. An
enhanced awareness of external threats after
11 September 2001 seems to have tipped the
balance towards security considerations. The
high level of responsiveness to public demands
in democratic states can be regarded as an
important source of democracies’ proactive
policies on internal security after the terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington. A
shared liberal political culture based on the
rule of law and the respect of individual rights
has proved to be equally important. The ‘zone
of law’ that exists among the Western
European democracies has enabled them to
negotiate effective extradition regimes,
including a European arrest warrant. The
importance of a shared liberal political culture
is underlined by the numerous references to
the high level of mutual trust that can be
found in European Commission proposals,
European Parliament resolutions, and
European Union law. Finally, the institutional
constraints characteristic of democratic states
turned out to have an inhibiting effect
whenever standards of individual rights were
in danger of being undermined by inter-
national commitments. Taken together, high
responsiveness, political culture, and insti-
tutional constraints have not been mutually
reinforcing. By contrast, the interplay of the
mechanisms are better characterized as an
antinomy (Müller, 2002a): democratic leaders
have had to cope with contradicting expec-
tations to enhance internal security without
undermining national democratic control
over individual rights.
The democratic peace perspective has also
helped to highlight important features of
extradition politics (or internal security
cooperation more broadly). To be sure, one
can hardly account for the development of
extradition politics without reference to
growing levels of interdependence. Particu-
larly among the member-states of the EU, the
free movement of people and the abolition of
border controls have been strong incentives
for international cooperation in internal
security politics. Thus, interdependence may
be regarded as the most important factor in
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extradition politics. Notwithstanding the
pivotal role of interdependence, however, the
democratic peace perspective adds to our
understanding of the mechanisms at play.
Indeed, it is hardly possible to understand the
introduction of the principle of mutual
recognition and the arrest warrant (as well as
the public’s acceptance of these measures)
without reference to the high level of mutual
trust that has evolved among the Western
European democracies. Moreover, only the
democratic peace perspective can account for
the fact that liberal democracies refuse to
negotiate effective extradition agreements
with countries with which a large number of
requests for extradition exist (e.g. Turkey),
whereas other countries with which only little
interdependence in criminal matters exists
have been a party to very efficient extradition
regimes. As pointed out above, however, the
single case study of extradition politics in
Europe does not allow for any test of the
explanatory value of ‘democracy’ against
other possible explanations (e.g. interdepen-
dence). As an explorative study, it may
demonstrate, however, that a further analysis
of internal security cooperation from a demo-
cratic peace perspective is warranted and
promising. Given that the security agenda
after 11 September 2001 will further blur the
differences between external and internal
security, there will be no shortage of cases to
be studied.
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